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State of Utah 
LA VORA SPENDLOVE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PAUL SHEWCHUCK, MATILDA SHEW-
CHUCK and MARY SHEWCHUCK, doing 
business as AMERICAN WINDOW CLEAN-
ING COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. / 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 7185 
This action was brought by plaintiff against the defendants 
for damages alleged to have resulted to her from a broken 
upper femur of the left leg suffered on the 3rd day of january, 
1947, while she was walking south on the sidewalk on the 
west side of Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah, near the 
center of the block between 23rd and 24th Streets. She alleged 
that the employee of the defendants, doing business as Amer-
ican Window Cleaning Company, was washing windows at 
Taylor-Wright Company (which was actually the Princess 
Shop, adjoining Taylor-Wrights on the north), and that as 
she passed him on the sidewalk, he projected the handle of 
a brush being used by him while washing windows out over 
a portion of the sidewalk and between her legs so that she be-
came entangled with it, causing her to fall to the sidewalk, 
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breaking her left leg between the knee and hip. Plaintiff 
alleges defendants were negligent, reckless, and careless, be-
cause of which she suffered the injuries complained of and 
she claims damages in the sum of $15,000.00 general and 
$4,260.00 special (Pages 010-012, Bill of Exceptions) as follows: 
medical care and hospitalization, $750.00; damage to clothing, 
$10.00; care of her children, $500.00. She also claimed that 
she had been unable to secure help at her home and that it 
had been necessary for her husband to remain at home to wait 
upon her to her damage in the sum of $1000.00, and loss of 
income from chickens in the sum of $2,000.00. In her original 
complaint plaintiff brought suit against Paul Shewchuck only, 
doing business as American Window Cleaning Company, setting 
forth the same facts, alleging the same general damage, but 
alleging special damages in the sum of $770.00 (Pages 001-003, 
Bill of Exceptions.) In her Amended and Supplemental Com-
plaint she included Paul Shewchuck's wife, Matilda, and 
daughter, Mary (Pages. 001-002, Bill of exceptions); and the 
Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed after the 
cause was fully at issue upon her original complaint (Pages 
OOJ-003, Bill of Exceptions), the answer of the defendant, Paul 
Shewchuck (Pages 006 and 007, Bill of Exceptions), and Plain-
tiff's reply (Page 009, Bill of Exceptions). The reply consisted 
of a general denial of the affirmative defense contained in the 
answer, and no reply was filed to the answer to the amended and 
supplemental complaint, which was filed without leave of court. 
A general and special demurrer was filed to the original com-
plaint and overruled (Pages 004 and 005, Bill of Exceptions). 
In his answer Paul Shewchuck denied generally and specially 
the main allegations of the complaint and affirmatively alleged 
negligence, carelessness and recklessness on the part of the 
plaintiff (Pages 006 and 007, Bill of Exceptions). Separate 
general demurrers were filed by each of the defendants to the 
amended and supplemental complaint (Pages 017-019, Bill of 
Exceptions) and were overruled. Separate answers were filed 
by each of the defendants (Pages 014, 021 and 023, Bill of 
Exceptions). The answer of the defendant, Paul Shewchuck, 
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was substantially the same as his original answer, and the 
answers of the two added defendants contained general denials 
of the material allegations of the amended and supplemental 
complaint and an affirmative defense that they were in no 
way connected with the American Window Cleaning Company. 
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on special interroga-
tories by the court (Page 039, Bill of exceptions) on the 23rd 
day of January, 1948. 
At the commencement of the trial and upon motion of 
the plaintiff the cause was dismissed as to the defendants, 
Matilda and Mary Shewchuck. A verdict was reached, award-
ing plaintiff general damages in the sum of $5,000.00 and 
special damages in the sum of $1,658.65 against the defen-
dant, Paul Shewchuck, and judgment on the verdict was en-
tered accordingly (Page 040, Bill of Exceptions). 
On the day of the accident the defendant, Paul Shewchuck, 
was admittedly not present but was in the hospital for an 
operation. His employee, Archie Hood, Jr., a colored man, 
was cleaning windows at the Princess Shop, where the accident 
occurred. 
A brief resume of the evidence is as follows: Plaintiff on 
the day in question was in Ogden shopping. She had made 
n purchase at Mode-O'Day Shop, some distance north of the 
scene of the accident, and proceeded south, headed for Penneys 
on the corner of 24th Street and Washington Boulevard (Page 
!50, Bill of Exceptions). It was about noon; the weather was 
fair and dry (Pages 43 and Ill, Bill of Exceptions). The side-
walk was 19 feet and a few inches wide (Page 185, Bill of Ex-
ceptions). There were very few people on the sidewalk, around 
a couple or three going south and around a couple or three 
going north (Page 192, 193 Bill of Exceptions). As she ap-
proached the Princess Shop and at quite some distance to the 
north, she noticed the colored man washing the windows at 
the south side of the Princess Shop (Pages 50 and 106, Bill 
of Exceptions). She noticed he was wiping the windows with 
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a long-handled wiper. She did not know exactly where she 
was walking except "where an ordinary person would walk" 
(Page 50, Bill of Exceptions); that as she approached the 
colored man brought the brush or wiper down, protruding the 
to her; (and as she turned to the east, her back was to him). 
She testified that (while she didn't see it as she passed) the 
colored man brought the brush or wiper down, protruding the 
handle out across the sidewalk and between her legs; that she 
tripped over it, falling to the pavement and knocking the wiper 
out of his hands (Pages 51 and 72, Bill of Exceptions); and, 
as heretofore stated, the upper femur of her left leg was broken 
about an inch below the hip joint (Pages 5 and 15, Bill of Ex-
ceptions). The plaintiff was hospitalized for about two weeks, 
during which time she suffered some distension of the ab-
domen, the cause of which was not definitely determined (Pages 
5-15, Bill of Exceptions). She was put to bed at her home 
f'for quite a few days" (Page 7, Bill of Exceptions). A Smith 
Peterson nail was used in the bone fragments, pinning them 
together. She made a satisfactory recovery (Page 6, Bill of 
Exceptions). There was some slight impairment in the use 
of her leg sideways. Otherwise, she was completely recovered 
(Pages 11, 12, 15 and 24, Bill of Exceptions). Plaintiff suffered 
from chronic asthma (Page 10, Bill of Exceptions). With the 
exception of a short period of time immediately following the 
accident, that was probably not adversely affected (Page 11, 
Bill of Exceptions). Plaintiff's doctor bill was $155.00 (Page 
200, Bill of Exceptions), with an additional $15.00 and $5.00 
(Page 62, Bill of Exceptions). She hired a hospital bed for 
$9.50 (Page 63, Bill of Exceptions). Her hospital bill was 
$97.50 (Page 63, Bill of Exceptions). She claimed costs of 
laundry at $125.00, although she kept no record of the same 
(Page 62, Bill of Exceptions); outlay for medicines $130.00, 
with no record kept (Pages 62, 74, 76 and 79, Bill of Excep-
tions); expenses of laboratory technician, $8.00 (Page 63, Bill 
of Exceptions); crutches, $2.50 to $3.00; and ambulance to 
take her home $5.00 (Page 144, Bill of Exceptions). Plaintiff's 
husband, Leland Spendlove, who was employed by Ogden City 
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previously at 82c an hour, (Pages 145 and 146, Bill of Excep-
tions) laid off his work and remained at home, where he 
waited on the plaintiff and took care of their little boy, 7 
years old, and about 300 chickens. He remained at home six 
and one-half months (Page 146, Bill of Exceptions) without 
making any effort to obtain the services of anyone to look 
after his wife (Pages 152-161, Bill of Exceptions). Evidence 
concerning the production of eggs in the Spendlove flock was 
admitted (Pages 68, 69, 70, 71, 159 and 160, Bill of Exeptions) 
but was neither submitted to the jury by special interrogatory 
or otherwise, nor was it withdrawn from them. Plaintiff testi-
fied that she was unable to get around except on crutches and 
then very limitedly for some months (Page 64, Bill of Excep-
tions). Defendant Paul Shewchuck testified that on or about 
March 1, 1947, less than two months after the accident, he 
went to her home to purchase eggs, and she was walking 
without the aid if crutches or any other support (Pages 181 
and 182, Bill of Exceptions). 
A description of the premises where the accident occurred 
may be found on Pages 104, 105, 186 and 187 of the Bill of Ex-
ceptions. The length of the window north and south being 
washed by defendant's agent was forty-three and one-fourth 
inches. Height of the window itself was six feet two inches. 
Below this window for a distance of between one and two 
feet was solid wall. There was a marquee extending back 
from the sidewalk and around a glass island in the center. 
There was a cardboard partition extending part of the dis-
tance through the glassed-in island in the marquee. The front 
of the island extended out parallel with the windows on the 
south and north side. There was a window on the north side, 
the same size as the window on the south which was being 
washed by defendant's agent. Arthur Williams, Manager of 
the Princess Shop, testified that he was in the window on the 
north side at the time of the accident. He testified that the 
plaintiff entered the marquee, apparently on the north side, 
and went around, coming out on the south side, or else she 
had been in the Princess Shop. He testified definitely to seeing 
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her leaving the store or marquee on the south entrance (Page 
165, Bill of Exceptions) and that "she was in a rapid hurry" 
(Page 165, Bill of Exceptions).· Plaintiff denied entering the 
marquee. 
The court submitted .spec~al interrogatori~s to the jury 
who gave answers thereto as. follows: 
"The jury should answer the following interrogatories, 
and from your answers to said interrogatories you will 
make up your verdict: 
1. Was the Defendant guilty of negligence on the 
third day of January, 1947, that proximately caused the 
plaintiff to suffer injuries at said time? 
Answer: 'Yes.' 
If yo·u answer the above question in the negative, then 
you should return a verdict of No Cause of Action. 
If you answer the question in the affirmative, then 
you should answer this question: 
2. Was the Plaintiff, LaVora Spendlove, guilty of 
contributory negligence that proximately caused the in-
juries which she received on the third day of January, 19·47? 
Answer: 'No.' 
If you answer this last question in the affirmative, 
then your verdict should be No Cause of Action; but if you 
answer it in the negative then you should answer the fol-
lowing questions: 
3. What amount of earnings and subsistence, if any, 
did the plaintiff suffer loss of by reason of said accident 
and injuries? 
'$1 ,000.00.' 
4. What amount of obligations as to doctor, hospital 
and medical bills did plain tiff suffer, if any, by reason of 
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said accident and injuries? 
'$523.65.' 
5. What amount of obligations did the plaintiff incur 
for the care of her child by reason of said ac.cident and in-
juries? 
'$135.00.' 
6. What amount of general damages, if any, did the 
plaintiff suffer by reason of said accident and injuries? 
'$5,000.00.' 
(Signed) "ARNOLD N. CROUCH 
Foreman." 
whereupon judgment was entered upon the verdict against the 
defendant, Paul Shewchuck, in the sum of $1,685.85 special 
damages "to cover loss of earnings and subsistence and obliga-
tions as to hospital, medical and doctor bills" and $5,000.00 
general damages. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS 
Defendant and appellant makes and assigns the following 
errors upon which he relies for a reversal of the judgment 
appealed from and as a basis for a direction from this court 
to the Trial Court to make and enter a judgment as prayed 
for by defendants: 
1. The Trial Court erred in overruling defendants' gen-
eral demurrer (Pages 005, 020, Bill of Exceptions). 
2. The Trial Court erred in failing to withdraw from the 
jury evidence concerning a pretended loss to plaintiff in the 
operation of her chickens (Pages 148 and 149, Bill of Excep-
tions). 
3. The Trial Court erred in overruling the defendants' 
objection to evidence concerning the earnings or salary of the 
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4. The Trial Court erred in submitting special interroga-
tory No. 3 to the jury (Pages 235, 236, Bill of Exceptions). 
5. The Trial Court erred in submitting Special Interroga-
tory No. 4 to the jury (Page 236, Bill of Exceptions). 
6. The Trial Court erred in its failure and refusal to give 
defendants' Requested Instruction No. 1. 
7. The Trial Court erred in its failure and refusal to 
give defendants' Requested Instruction No. 2. 
8. The Trial Court erred in its failure and refusal to give 
defendants' Requested Instruction No. 3. 
9. The Trial Court erred in its failure and refusal to give 
defendants' Requested Instruction No. 4. 
10. The court erred in submitting to the jury Instruction 
No.5. 
11. The court erred in submitting to the jury Instruction 
No.8. 
12. The court erred in submitting to the jury Instruction 
No. 10. 
13. The court erred in submitting to the jury Instruction 
No. 11. 
14. The court erred in submitting to the jury Instruction 
No. 12. 
15. The Trial Court erred in entering the judgment on 
the verdict. 
THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
The Trial Court's refusal to sustain defendants' demurrer 
to amended and supplemental complaint and to direct a 
verdict for defendants and against plain-tiff. A discussion of 
this involves Assignments of Error Nos. 1, 6, and 15. 
10 
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II 
· The admission of evidence concerning the earnings or 
salary of Leland Spendlove, husband of plaintiff, and not as-
signed to plaintiff. This involves a discussion of Assignments 
of Error Nos. 3, part of 4, (relating to special interrogatory No. 
3), and 9. 
Ill 
The Trial Court's refusal to properly instruct the jury 
upon contributory negligence. This involves a discussion of 
defendants' Assignments of Error Nos. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12,13 and 
14. 
IV 
Whether plaintiff's evidence with respect to her loss for 
medicines and laundry was so vague and indefinite and her 
evidence with respect to loss on chickens was so vague and 
speculative that the same should all have been withdrawn from 
the jury completely. This involves a discussion of Assignments 
of Error Nos. 2 and 5. 
Since the Assignments of Error overlap and run together 
in some instances, we will discuss them so far as possible in the 
order grouped above. 
DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED. FAILING IN 
THAT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN AND A VERDICT DIRECTED 
IN HIS FAVOR AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF, OR THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD HAVE REFUSED TO ENTER A JUDG-
MENT ON THE VERDICT FOR THE REASONS THAT 
A. Plaintiff does not plead a cause of action. 
B. She failed to prove a cause of action, and 
C. Regardless of the verdict of the jury, under the facts 
pleaded and the evidence offered she had no cause of action. 
11 
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Paragraph 3 of the complaint reads in part as follows: 
"That on the aforesaid 3rd day of january, 1947, this 
plaintiff was walking along said sidewalk on the west side 
of Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah, in front of the 
aforesaid Taylor-Wright Company; that the defendants 
then and there, through their agents and employees, were 
cleaning the windows of the said Taylor-W.right Company; 
that one of said agents was standing on the sidewalk with 
his face toward the windows and his back toward pedes-
trian traffic and was using a long-handled mop or window 
cleaner in the operation of cleaning said windows.* That 
as the plaintiff approached the point where the agent of 
the defendants was cleaning said windows, said employee 
had the window cleaner with the long handle extended 
vertically into the air parallel with the window, but as the 
plaintiff reached a point even with the said employee, the 
said agent carelessly, recklessly and negligently, without 
looking and without any regard for the safety of 
pedestrians using the sidewalk, and particularly for the 
safety of this plaintiff, suddenly pulled said long-handled 
window cleaner down without turning around and negli-
gently, recklessly, carelessly and suddenly thrust the handle 
of said window cleaner across the sidewalk so as to sud-
denly project the said handle between the legs of the plain-
tiff and trip her so that she fell to the paved sidewalk with 
great force." 
The paragraph quoted is the charging part of the com-
plaint. Plaintiff pleads facts apparently observed by her and 
known to her at the time of and prior to the accident. In other 
words, she has stated in effect that she saw the defendants' 
agent washing a window at the time and place given, using a 
dangerous instrumentality (a brush with a long handle) and 
the effect of the pleading is to admit, and we think she does 
admit that having seen or observed the work being done by 
defendants' agent and the instrumentality with which he was 
doing the work, and having observed that his back was turned 
12 
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to her so that she could see him but that he could not see her 
in that position, yet she walked so closely to him in full know-
ledge of the peril of her position that she tripped over the 
handle, which she had already perceived him using. At no place 
in the complaint, neither factually or by conclusion, does she 
even infer that she used any degree of care after having ob-
served the condition of peril she was about to place herself in, 
to avoid the results which actually occurred. The charging part 
of her pleading shows, in other words, that she observed a con-
dition of peril, knew it existed and made no effort to avoid 
walking into it. The complaint does not at any place in the 
least, even by inference negative contributory negligence on 
her part but actually in effect pleads contributory negligence 
on her part, and thus defeated the statement of a cause of ac-
tion. Birsch v. Citizens Elec. Co. 36 Mont. 574, 93 P. 940. There-
fore defendants' demurrer should have been sustained. 
Plaintiff's evidence clearly shows contributory negligence 
on her part as a matter of law. She stated in effect that she was 
on a shopping tour. It was near noon, and her husband and 
two young children were at home. She intended going into 
Penneys, apparently to make a purchase, before going home 
to fix their noon-day meal. The above facts indicate strongly 
that she was in a hurry and the evidence proves that she was. 
The witness Glen Williams testified that "she was in a rapid 
hurry." She testified she did not know just what portion of 
the sidewalk she occupied but said she was walking "where an 
ordinary person would walk." The sidewalk was dry, the weather 
was good, and she had a parcel and a purse or bag in her arms. 
She further testified that even before she came to the north 
side of the Princess Shop and just after she left the Mode-
O'Day Shop to the north she saw Archie Hood washing the 
window at the south of the Princess Shop, using a long-handled 
brush, and his back was turned to her, so that for a considerable 
distance before she reached the point of impact she saw and 
must have realized the peril she would be placed in unless she 
continued to watch his movements and detoured sufficiently 
to avoid colliding with him. or the brush. She admitted on cross 
13 
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examination that the sidewalk was likely nine or ten feet wide. 
(It was actually nineteen feet some inches wide). So that from 
her own evidence there was ample room on the sidewalk which 
was not in the least congested, (but very little pedestrian traf-
fic), to walk to the east far enough to avoid colliding with the 
defendants' agent and thus assure her safety. Instead of doing 
that, she testified that as she reached a point back of the col-
ored man, she turned out of the way a little bit, apparently to 
the east, which would place her back admittedly toward the 
colored man's back and close enough to him that when the 
handle came down she tripped over it and fell. All of the damage 
she testified to resulted from that fall. 
Looking at the case in its worst light against the defen-
dant (and for the sake of the argument, admitting that his 
agent might have been negligent, (which we do not), the plain-
tiff in her own complaint and in her own testimony shows 
clearly that she was guilty of contributory negligence, which 
occurred at least concurrently with any negligence of the de-
fendant's agent, if there was any. Our conclusion may be differ-
ent if the doctrine of comparative negligence had been adopted 
in this state, but since the doctrine of contributory negligence 
has been adopted instead thereof, the rule we think is very 
succinctly stated in 114 A. L. R. in a note beginning on Page 
830, as follows: 
"A fundamental doctrine of the common law is that 
while defendants' negligence subjects him to a liability to 
the plaintiff, yet if the plaintiff's negligence also proxi-
mately contributed, although in slight degree, to the in-
jury, there is no right of recovery whatever. * "The neg-
ligence of the plaintiff, which will defeat recovery, must be 
such as directly contributes to the injury-It must be a 
proximate cause of the injury." So that while the fact that 
the plaintiff's negligence was slight or negligible as com-
pared with that of the defendant will not defeat the rule. 
"Thus it is said that to warrant the application of the 
doctrine of contributory negligence 'the plaintiff's negli-
14 
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gence must have entered into and formed a part of the 
efficient cause of the injury, and if it operated only re-
motely and not proximately to cause the damages, the plain-
tiff is not barred of redress, and hence a recovery should 
be allowed if it appears that the plaintiff's negligent act 
or omission was prior in time to AND NOT MUTUAL WITH 
THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT. (Caps ours)' * In order 
to defeat his action the plaintiff's conduct must have con-
tributed to the injury in such a way that if he had not been 
at fault, he would have escaped injury entirely." 
For further discussion of the general rule see 38 Am. jur. 
Xll Contributory Negligence, Sec. 174 Pg. 848 . 
. The distinction between the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence and the doctrine of contributory negligence is no doubt 
clear to this court, but for the sake of convenience and to assist 
in the presentation of this case we shall restate that distinction 
as contained in the note in 114 A. L. R. supra. 
"(1) Doctrine of Comparative Negligence. Even 
though the plaintiff was negligent and even though his 
negligence concurrently with the defendant's negligence 
proximately caused his injury, he may recover if the degree 
of his negligence was slight as compared with that of the 
defendants. 
"(2) Doctrine of Contributory Negligence as Lim-
ited by or in its relation to the Doctrine of Proximate Cause. 
-While the contributory negligence o.f the plaintiff, how-
ever slight, will defeat his right to recover if it was the 
proximate or the concurrent cause of his injury, it will not 
defeat that recovery if it merely remotely caused or con-
tributed to the injury. It will be observed, therefore, that 
recovery is permitted under the former doctrine because 
the degree of plaintiff's negligence was slight as compared 
with that of the defendant, although having a direct and 
proximate casual connection with the injury, and under the 
latter because plaintiff's negligence did not have that direct 
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and proximate and casual connection necessary for the 
application of the doctrine barring recovery. In other words, 
recovery is permitted in the one instance in spite of the 
doctrine of contributory negligence and in the other in 
conformity therewith." 
The authority continues on. 
"The rule first referred to is in derogation of the lat-
ter rule, and except as adopted by statute, it has been gen-
erally repudiated in most jurisdictions, whereas the latter 
prevails in every jurisdiction where the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence prevails as an integral part of that 
doctrine." 
We fail to find any statute in this state adopting the rule 
of comparative negligence. As a matter of fact, this court com-
monly, generally and, we believe, universally, has adopted the 
doctrine of contributory negligence and repudiated the doctrine 
of comparative negligence, the leading case perhaps being Myers 
v. San Pedro L.A. & S. L. R. Co., 39 Utah 198, 116 Pac. 119. 
Under that theory defendants' Requested Instruction No. 
3 should have been presented to the jury, since we think it cor-
rectly states the law under the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence. The instruction submitted on contributory negligence 
is No.8, which, as used among lawyers, perhaps correctly states 
the abstract definition of contributory negligence but makes no 
application of the rule in such form that a jury of lay persons 
could properly understand the same and apply it in the light of 
the evidence in this case. The states, including the United States, 
which have adopted the contributory negligence rule as well 
as the ones which have adopted the comparative negligence 
rule are collected and shown on Pages 836 and 837 of the above-
numbered volume of A. L. R. 
The contributory negligence rule is followed apparently 
in all states, including Utah, which have not adopted the rule 
of comparative negligence. In the Ohio case of Bartson v. Craig, 
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121 Ohio, S. T. 371, 169 NE, 291, the Supreme Court of that 
state said: 
"Negligence on the part of the plaintiff if it concurr 
with the negligence of the defendant to directly cause the 
accident and consequent injury will defeat recovery by 
the plaintiff. Whatever the degree, even though slight, in 
comparison to the negligence of the defendant, if the fault 
of the plaintiff was operative, the plaintiff is concluded 
regardless of the degree in which it was operative. Plain-
tiff's negligence directly causing or contributing to cause 
his injuries does warrant a finding against him upon his 
claim for damages, and that is true regardless of the degree 
or extent and hence, if it directly contributes in the slightest 
degree to cause the injury, it being a part of the direct 
cause, recovery by the plaintiff is not authorized." 
Plaintiff's testimony should be viewed least favorably to 
her. Morton v. Mooney, 97 Montana l, 33 Pac. (2) 262. In that 
case the court laid down the rule as follows: 
"*He is not entitled to recover if he be the plaintiff 
unless that portion of his testimony which is least favorable 
to his contention is of such a character as to authorize a 
recovery in his behalf." 
and cites Putnam v. Putnam, 86 Mont., 135, 282 Pac. 855; Las by 
v. Burgess, 88 Mont. 49, 289 Pac., 1028; Merritt v. Tague, 94 
Mont. 595, 23 Pac. (2) 340. 
Plaintiff had reason to apprehend danger as she saw de-
fendants' agent working with a long-handled brush and failed 
to take any precaution against it, giving rise to a legal presump-
tion of contributory negligence. Hughey v. Fergus County, 98 
Mont. 98, 37 Pac. (2), 1035; Mullens v. City of Butte, 93 Mont. 
601, 20 Pac. (2), 626; Nielson v. Missoula Creamery Company, 
59 Mont. 270, 196 Pac. 357. 
In the Hughey v. Fergus County case Supra, the Supreme 
Court of Montana said in part, 
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and 
"When, therefore, a plaintiff asserts the right of recov-
ery on the ground of culpable negligence of the defendant, 
he is bound to show that he exerdsed his intelligence to dis-
cover and avoid the danger which he alleges was brought 
about by the negligence of the defendant." (Sherris v. 
Northern Pacific Railway Company, 55 Mont. 189, 175 Pac. 
269.) 
"When the circumstances attending the injury, as de-
tailed by the plaintiff's evidence, raise a presumption that 
he was not, at the time, in the exercise of due care, he has 
failed to make out a case for the jury. The burden is then 
upon him, and if he fails to introduce other evidence to re-
move this presumption, he is properly nonsuited." (George 
v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 59 Mont. 162, 196 Pac. 869, 
870). Otherwise stated, the rule is that when plaintiff's own 
case presents evidence which, unexplained, makes out 
prima facie contributory negligence upon his part, there 
must be further evidence exculpating him or he cannot re-
cover. Olsen v. City of Butte, 86 Mont. 240, 283 Pac. 222, 
70 A. L. R. 1352." 
The court further said: 
"In view of the nature of the evidence as outlined, it 
cannot be said that the plaintiff was not negligent, or that 
he had no reason to apprehend danger, nor yet that his 
negligence did not directly contribute to his injury as a 
proximate cause thereof. But one reasonable conclusion 
can be reached from the facts, and that conclusion is that, 
had the plaintiff exercised that degree of care which an 
ordinarily prudent man, possessed of the knowledge which 
the plaintiff said he had, would have exercised in the cir-
cumstances, he would not have suffered the injury of which 
he complains." 
It has been held that the negligence of a railway corpora-
tion in failing to whistle or ring the bell as the train approaches 
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the crossing is excused by negligence on the part of a person 
about to cross in not using his senses to discover the danger. 
Carlson v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 96 Minn. 504, 113 Am. St. Rep. 
655. 
In jensen v. Logan City, 57 Pac. (2) 708, in discussing this 
rule this court, speaking through Honorable Justice Wolfe, said 
on Page 715, the reason is that plaintiff is not relieved from the 
necessity of 
"establishing the allegations of his complaint by evidence 
of such facts and conduct on his part free from inferences 
that may reasonably be drawn therefrom tending to show 
that he was not without negligence in connection with the 
acts complained of." 
and citing Riley v. Good, 142 Ore. 155, 18 Pac. (2) 222. 
In Pollari v. Salt Lake City, a very recent case, reported in 
176 Pac. (2) at 111, where plaintiff sued Salt Lake City for 
damages resulting from injury sustained in stepping in a hole 
or slipping and falling on a defective sidewalk, this court held, 
where plaintiff said "she did not see the defective condition of 
the sidewalk before she fell" that 
"The evidence shows that it was light enough so that 
the plaintiff could see the ice and so that in the very short 
time between her fall and the arrival of Mr. Baker to assist 
her, she was able to see the hole, the difference in elevation 
and the presence or absence of snow." 
and in explaining the rule on contributory negligence the court 
said, again speaking through the Honorable Justice Wolfe: 
"Plaintiff cannot recover where he himself did. not 
observe the standards of law imposed upon him", 
and citing Jensen v. Logan City, Supra; Riley v. Good, supra, 
Based upon these standards, defendants' demurrer should have 
been sustained, since upon plaintiff's complaint itself she brings 
herself within the rule negativing by her own admissions the 
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absence of contributory negligence on her part which proxi-
mately caused or concurrently contributed to the accident com-
plained of. The court having refused to sustain the demurrer, 
then based upon plaintiff's evidence in the light of the fore-
going rules, the jury should have been instructed, according to 
defendants' Request No. 1, to bring in a verdict for plaintiff 
and against the defendant. 
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES: 
Ray Clawson said plaintiff was standing approximately 4 
feet from the building line when he arrived. (Page 40, Bill of 
Exceptions.) 
jack Biddulph stated the weather was good; there was no 
storm; the sidewalk was bare, and there was no wind. (Page 40-
44, Bill of Exceptions.) 
Harold P. Stone, who arrived immediately after the acci-
dent and before plaintiff had arisen (he helped her up), testi-
fied that she was sitting either in the foyer in front of or adjac-
ent to Taylor-Wrights (adjoining the Princess Shop) up against 
the building off the sidewalk. (Page 47, Bill of Exceptions.) 
Plaintiff herself testified there was no snow and the side-
walk was perfectly dry, (Page 50, Bill of Exceptions.) She saw 
how the defendants' agent was manipulating the long-handled 
brush or wiper (Page 51, Bill of Exceptions); that he was facing 
the window with his back to her (Page 52, Bill of Exceptions). 
Her only precaution was, as she stated it, "I turned out a little 
bit" (Page 50, Bill of Exceptions), which then placed her in a 
position where she could not see him and knowing that he could 
not see her. She testified that as she started to pass Mr. Hood, 
the brush was up and ready to be brought down (Page 72, BiU 
of Exceptions). Common intelligence should have told her that 
as the brush came down, the handle would to some extent pro-
trude out, creating a hazard. She testified that she fell out 
toward the southeast and on her left hip, (Pages 52, 112, Bill 
of Exceptions). She further testified that she came straight up 
the street so that she was in full view of Mr. Hood all of the 
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time (Pages 106, 107 and 108, Bill of Exceptions). She did not 
know upon what part of the sidewalk she was walking, but she 
turned a little bit east. She observed that the handle on the 
brush was about six feet long (Page 109, Bill of Exceptions.) 
She testified that she had not arisen before Mr. Stone helped 
her up; that she was seated when Mr. Stone came up approxi-
mately where she fell (Page 110, Bill of Exceptions). We think 
all of plaintiff's testimony is rife with contributory negligence, 
which proximately and concurrently contributed to her injuries. 
Certainly she gets no consolation from defendants' testimony. 
Glen Arthur Williams testified to seeing her in the foyer of the 
Princess Shop, going around the glassed-in island to the south 
side thereof and going out on to the sidewalk just immediately 
before the accident, and that "She was in a rapid hurry," (Page 
165, Bill of Exceptions). He saw her just after the accident, 
sitting up against the wall of the building, and that the sidewalk 
here was eighteen or nineteen feet wide from the building wall 
to the curb (Page 167, Bill of Exceptions). All of the walls 
forming the foyer around the glassed-in island, as well as the 
walls of the said island, except for a distance of between one 
and two feet from the pavement, were of glass (so that if plain-
tiff went into the foyer and around the island, as he testified 
she did, she could at all times see Mr. Hood washing the window 
at the south and east corner); that the window was only four 
or five feet wide (Pages 171, 172, Bill of Exceptions). (It was 
actually 43-1/4 inches wide, (Page 187, Bill of Exceptions). The 
defendant, Paul Shewchuck, testified that he had instructed 
Mr. Hood in the proper and safe way to use the equipment to 
wash windows (Pages 177, 178, Bill of Exceptions). (The court 
refused to accept testimony as to whether Mr. Hood generally 
used the equipment according to instructions, (Page 179, Bill of 
Exceptions). He further testified that the sidewalk at the place 
of the accident was nineteen feet and a few inches wide (Page 
185, Bill of Exceptions). 
Archie Hood testified that he was washing the windows in 
question on the occasion of the accident. He had been in the 
employ of the defendant twenty to twenty-one months (Page 
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190, Bill of Exceptions). He said, "When I got out here to the 
sidewalk, I looked north and south to see if I saw anybody. 
Question-Had you looked both ways? Answer: Yes, sir, both 
ways." That the people he saw coming from the north were 
north of the Princess Shop. Those coming from the south were 
going into Tay-lor-Wrights (Pages 192, 193, Bill of Exceptions). 
He further stated he wanted to keep clear and that was why 
he looked in both directions before starting to wash the win-
dows (Page 193, Bill of Exceptions). He said he knew he had 
time to wash the windows before any people then in view 
reached him. He was standing with his right foot eleven and 
one-half inches from the wall. The handle he was using was six 
feet three inches long. He took the brush in his hand, without 
the handle, to brush the window from the height to which he 
could reach to the bottom; that while he was using the handle, 
it "couldn't be no farther than just past my leg" (Page 194, 
Bill of Exceptions) not more than twenty-four inches from the 
wall (Page 195, Bill of Exceptions). His bucket and other uten-
sils were left back at the rear of the foyer. He further testified 
that when plaintiff fell, she was lying between three and three 
and one-half feet from the wall. She was lying diagonally on 
the sidewalk, and that there was a little rise in the sidewalk 
extending out at the juncture of Taylor-Wrights and the Prin-
cess Shop about where she fell. He did not see her or know she 
was there before she hit his stick, (Page 198, Bill of Excep-
tions), so that whatever view one may take of the evidence, 
whether, as plaintiff testified, she was coming down the street 
from north to south, or, as Mr. Williams testified, that she was 
coming out of the foyer to the Princess Shop, she was neverthe-
less in a position at all times to watch and observe the actions 
of Mr. Hood; and she admits that she did watch and observe 
his actions at all times until she got right to him, and the only 
precaution she then took, if any, was to turn "a little bit to the 
east", which placed her back toward his back, so that neither 
could see the other. 
The only fair conclusion which can be reached is that she 
was walking much too close to the window where she saw a 
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man working in full view, or if she came out of the foyer of the 
Princess Shop, she turned the corner rapidly and sharply on to 
the sidewalk, and in either event so close to Mr. Hood that she 
ran into the end of the handle and fell. Apparently he had no 
opportunity to avoid the accident. He took every precaution, 
looking both ways for pedestrian traffic and keeping the handle 
of the brush very close to the building and to himself. Had 
plaintiff exercised the degree of care that an ordinarily prudent 
person would have exercised under all of the circumstances and 
in full view of the peril or danger that her intelligence should 
have warned her of, she would have stepped out of the way to 
the east far enough to make sure that she would avoid the 
collision, all of the time observing the motions of the workman 
and the position of the brush handle. Had she done this, no 
injuries would have been suffered by her, and the jury should 
have been instructed to bring in a verdict against her, as set 
forth in defendants' Request No. l. Failing in that, the court 
should have instructed the jury properly on the law of con-
trib-utory negligence, as requested by Defendants' Request Nos. 
2 and 3 and not as it did (simply giving an abstract definition 
of the term "contributory negligence"). See 38 Am. juris., Neg-
ligence, Sections 366 and 367. Burmingham R. Light and P. Co. 
v. Bynum, 139 Ala. 389, 36 Southern, 736. In the last cited case 
it was held error to refuse to give the following requested in-
struction, 
"If the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proxi-
mately contributed even in the slightest degree to his in-
jury, the jury must return a verdict for the defendant," 
the court said, 
"It is certainly the law that any want of care, however 
slight, on the part of the plaintiff, if it contributed proxi-
mately to produce the injury, will defeat the action." 
See also Riley v. Good, supra, where an instruction almost ver-
batim with defendants' Request No. 3 was upheld. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXCLUDED EVI-
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DENCE OF THE EARNINGS OF LELAND SPENDLOVE, 
PLAINTIFF'S HUSBAND. 
A. Utah has no community property law. 
B. Plaintiff could not recover for her husband's loss of 
salary, even if he justified that loss. 
C. No justification was shown for plaintiff's husband's 
loss of salary. 
It will be noted that the theory upon which the loss claimed 
by Leland Spendlove, so far as the complaint is concerned, is as 
follows: 
"That plaintiff has been unable to secure help at her 
home and that it has been necessary for her husband to wait 
upon her and to take care of the household duties to the 
plaintiff's damage in the sum of $1 ,000.00" (Bill of Ex-
ceptions, Page 0 12). 
When asked what effort he had made to obtain the services 
of someone to take care of Mrs. Spendlive so that he could 
remain at work, he answered, "I didn't try myself after the wife 
came home. She called on the telephone." Asked again whether 
he tried to get anyone to come to the home, he answered "No." 
(Pages 150 and 159, Bill of Exceptions). Beginning about the 
middle of February, he testified, his wife was getting around 
the house with crutches (Page 159, Bill of Exceptions.) The 
evidence shows that plaintiff gradually recovered from the 
time she was taken home and during most of the time got 
around the house and that the two-year old child of the parties 
was being taken care of by plaintiff's sister, Mrs. Marjorie 
Koldewyn, and for which the jury granted her $135.00. Asked 
again "And you didn't make any effort to get anyone to take 
care of her and you didn't return to work until july 14, 1947" 
answer, "That's right." (Page 159, Bi11 of Exceptions). He testi-
fied to hearing Mrs. Spendlove make telephone calls; that he 
did not remember hearing her make any inquiry as to what it 
would cost to have a woman come into the home to take care 
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of her (Page 160, Bill of Exceptions). The only testimony of 
LaVora Spendlove concerning her efforts to obtain help is 
found on Page 163 Bill of Exceptions, where she testified to 
calling an employment agency. She did not testify that she at .. 
tempted to get anyone to come to her home but said she in-
quired of someone (there being no showin·g who) that she was 
told that the wage scale for ordinary household labor jobs was 
75c per hour. 
The uncertainty created in the minds of the Jurors .may 
perhaps be well evidenced by the, uncertainty iri<the minds of 
counsel and the court .a.s shown. on Pa:ge 225, Bill of Excep~ 
tions, where counsel fo:r plaintiff, .after having shown that' Le~ 
land Spendlove remained away from work approxima:tely six 
and one-half months; that he was being paid 82c per hour or 
approximately $160.00 per month (Page 146, Bill of Excep-
tions) asked leave to amend his complaint to show'· that the 
reasonable value of the services performed for her care was 75a 
per hour, based on the average day. The motion was not granted, 
but the court made the following significant statement, "Well, 
the difficulty now is what could the· jury find as to th;e number 
of hours?" Nothing further was done about it, but the jury 
allowed the sum of $1 ,000.00. The confusion in their minds is 
further shown by the conversation between the foreman of the 
jury and the court, as found on Page 244, Bill of Exceptions~ 
Apparently they were thinking of loss of wages to Leland 
Spendlove. The court, in answer to a question from the·jo.reman 
of the jury, said, "Did you mean if you dismiss 'against one or 
the other, the other could bring a suit?" Foreman of the Jury: 
''Yes." The Court: "Not unless. they appealed tQ the Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Court said that your decision was un-
fair or not according to law." Whether the juri had in mind 
the question of Leland Spendlove's wages or the uncertainty 
concerning the chickens testified to or the uncertainty concern-
ing the amount of damage for' medicines and laundry or all of 
them cannot be told, but certainly some confusion existed, and 
there appears ample rea~on for the confusion and uncertainty, 
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In answer to Special Interrogatory No. 3 "What amount 
of earnings and subsistence, if any, did the plaintiff suffer loss 
of by reas.on of such injuries," the jury answered $1,000.00,. 
there is no evidence that plaintiff was ever employed, lost any 
earnings, had her earning power depreciated or that she lost 
any subsistence by reason of the injuries. Therefore, it must 
be presumed that the $1 ,000.00 gran ted by the jury was taken 
irrespective of proof or anything else from plaintiff's com-
plaint, wherein she claimed her husband lost $1,000.00 in wages. 
Plaintiff was confined to her bed approximately one month, 
(Page 142, Bill of Exceptions.) He testified that he was em-
ployed in the Ogden City Street Department. Objection was 
made to his earnings and the objection overruled, (Page 145, 
Bill of Exceptions.) He testified to earning 82c per hour, over 
the objections of the defendants; that his earnings were $80.00 
to $85.00 for a two-week period, which would amount to $160.00 
per month or thereabouts, or $1 ,040.00, (Page 146, Bill of Ex-
ceptions.) No assignment of these wages is claimed or shown. 
No evidence was offered as to the reasonable value of the ser-
vices rendered plaintiff by her husband. Under Section 40-2-4, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, plaintiff would have been entitled 
to a judgment for her own ioss of earnings had she sustained 
any. That action could not be maintained by the husband. 
Neither can the wife dU'ring the life and mental capacity of the 
husband. recover for his loss of earnings. The damages recover-
able in this class of case are compensatory only, and under the 
rule a person whose interests of personality have been tor-
tiously invaded is entitled to recover damages for past or pros-
pective 
A. Bodily harm and emotional distress. 
B. Loss of earning capacity or earnings. 
C. Reasonable medical and other expenses. 
D. Resulting harm to property or business. 
Restatement of the Law, Torts, Section 924 of Chapter 47. Loss 
of earning capacity means just what it says, amount of earn-
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ings which the injured party has been prevented from acquiring 
or "the amount which he probably could have earned in work 
for which he was fitted up to the time of the trial." Under Com-
ment on Clause C of the same Section, Page 637, it is stated, 
"However, there can be no recovery for services for 
which a third person may recover." 
The wages of Mr. Spendlove could be recovered, as heretofore 
stated, only by himself, which would be equally true, we think, 
of his loss of wages. It cannot be said that Mrs. Spendlove would 
be legally entitled to collect her husband's wages. In the event 
of his death, they would be recovered only by his administrator 
or executor. Under Section 693, Topic 2, Torts, Restatement of 
the Law, it is said, 
"Under statutes permitting the wife to recover all 
damages suffered as a result of the defendant's tortious 
conduct, including the value of her services, such an item 
of damages is not recoverable by the husband." 
The converse should be true that the wife cannot recover for 
loss suffered by the husband. Under Section 695 it is stated, 
"Although a husband is entitled to recover for loss of 
his wife's services and society and any expense which he 
incurs, as a result of illness or bodily harm caused to her 
by the tortious conduct of another, a wife is not entitled 
to recover under similar circumstances. The wife is not, 
nor has she ever been entitled to the services of her hus-
band. * The husband is still legally bound to provide sup-
port for her, and the tortfeasor is liable to the husband for 
any loss of earning power which he may suffer. This the 
husband himself may recover, and were his wife permitted 
to recover for the loss of support, a double recovery would 
result." 
Compensatory damages are discussed fully in Chapter 3, 
Vol. 15, Am. Jur., beginning on Page 397. An injured person, 
as stated in Section 27, 15 Am. jur., Page 420, "Is bound to 
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protect himself if he can do so with reasonable exertion or the 
trifling expense and can recover from the delinquent party 
only such damages as he could not with reasonable effort have 
avoided." 
Setting forth a long list of cases under Note 13, we think, 
therefore, that 
1. Defendants' objection to plaintiff's testimony concern-
ing loss of husband's wages should have been sustained, and 
2. Failing in that, all evidence concerning the same should 
have been withdrawn from the jury as proposed in defendants' 
Request No. 4. 
Ill 
The Assignments of Error under Questions Involved No. 
3 have been considered and pre~ented along with Question 
No. 1. 
IV 
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO LOSS 
FOR MEDICINES AND LAUNDRY WAS SO VAGUE AND IN-
DEFINITE AND HER EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO LOSS 
ON CHICKENS WAS SO VAGUE AND SPECULATIVE THAT 
THE SAME SHOULD ALL HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN 
FROM THE JURY COMPLETELY. 
Considerable evidence was offered concerning the pro-
duction of the chickens claimed by plaintiff and her husband 
(Pages 68 to 71, 90 to 100, 113 to 115, and 118, Bill of Excep-
tions.) Discussion was had by the court and counsel concerning 
the speculative nature of this testimony and the uncertainty 
of it, but nothing was done about it. It was neither presented 
to the jury by special interrogatory, nor was it withdrawn from 
them, (Pages 148 and 149, Bill of Exceptions). No record was 
kept by plaintiff concerning the costs of medicines purchased 
which she estimated at $130.00 (Page 62 and 74-85 incl., Bill of 
Exceptions) and costs of laundry, which she estimated at $125.00 
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(Page 62 and 87-90 incl., Bill of Exceptions). ·These items we 
think so vague and uncertain that they should not have been 
permitted to go to the jury. 
It is stated in 15 Am. Jur., Section 356, Page 795, 
"As a rule, however, actual or compensatory damages 
are not to be presumed but must be proved. To warrant 
their recovery the actual detriment occasioned must be 
shown by competent evidence and with reasonable cer-
tainty for the recovery is limited to such damages as are 
established by the evidence. * The evidence must afford 
data, facts and circumstances reasonably certain from 
which the jury may find the actual loss, and the plaintiff 
must show by a preponderance of the evidence the damages 
caused by the injury complained of. * It has been said that 
the amount of loss is as much a fact to be proved as the 
fact of loss. * Damages cannot be found from mere specu-
lative and conjectural evidence." 
A careful reading of the testimony of the plaintiff will show 
that her estimate of the costs of medicine and of having her 
laundry done were nothing but mere guesses. There was not a 
fact stated upon which a definite amount could be reached in 
either event. The same was true with respect to her chickens. 
The verdict does not set forth what amounts were allowed her 
for those items. 
We respectfully submit, therefore, that the judgment ap-
pealed from should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRA A. HUGGINS 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants. 
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